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As with other developing economies, during the ‘Golden Age o f Capitalism’ Puerto Rico 
registered high rates of economic growth (see Table 1 below)1, accompanied by rising levels of 
productivity reflecting a process of convergence relative to the United States. This impressive 
performance gave credence to the comparison with the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) 
labelling Puerto Rico as the ‘fifth tiger.’
Table 1 
Real GDP growth 
1950 -  2001





1950-1973 n.a. 5.9 5.5 4.2 6.7
1966-1973 5.1 4.8 6.9 4.0 6.9
1974-1980 3.4 2.9 5.0 2.5 3.4
1981-1990 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.2 4.3
1991-1997 2.2 1.9 5.0 2.8 3.9
1993-2002 3.5 2.7 5.1 3.4 4.8
Source: Davidson (2003), NBER (2004); Planning Board of Puerto Rico (2003)
In the early 1970s, fortunes were reversed and Puerto Rico experienced a period of 
economic decline leading to a widening gap with the United States that lasted well into the 
middle of the 1980s. The hallmarks of this period included, among others, a significant fall of the 
investment coefficient and a doubling o f the rate o f unemployment. The overall economic and 
social effects were mitigated in part by the existence of ‘safety valves’ such as migration and 
unilateral transfers from the United States that offset losses in income and employment. Starting 
in 1986, the Puerto Rican economy looked poised for another period o f growth and convergence 
that appeared sustainable even if  the mixed performance signals brought about by 2003 were 
taken into account.
The first phase was underpinned by the significant increase in the formation o f gross 
fixed capital. The expansion o f domestic investment was encouraged by a tax incentives policy 
that ultimately benefited the development o f Puerto Rican industry .
1 The Golden Age of Capitalism includes the period 1950-1973. It is important to note that during this period 
‘convergence’ was the norm rather than the exception. In this sense, Maddison (1991) writes: ‘A major 
characteristic of capitalist development has been the post-war convergence in levels per capita income and 
productivity between these advanced countries’. The expression ‘fifth tiger’ is borrowed from Baumol and Wolff 
(1996).
2 The four East Asian tigers are: Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea.
3 It can be argued that this first phase can be explained by a simple Keynesian model for a closed economy.
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It is generally argued that ‘Operation Bootstrap’ or ‘industrialisation by invitation’ was 
the core economic strategy followed in this period and that the following period of decline 
resulted from the failure of these policies to ‘adjust to the realities o f increasing global 
competition’4.
Contrarily the paper sustains that, while it can be argued that the first stage of ‘Operation 
Bootstrap’ was implemented in Phase I, it is in fact in the phase o f decline and divergence (i.e., 
Phase II) that ‘industrialisation by invitation’ was developed to its full extent.
Furthermore it asserts that these policies failed to provide the adequate stimuli to growth 
and that this explains in part the contraction in economic activity. Indeed, during this phase 
economic policy encouraged, via federal and national tax incentives, a foreign capital-based 
manufacturing and services sector which was allowed to repatriate its profits back to the United 
States. As a result this period saw a widening gap between the income produced and that 
available in Puerto Rico. At the same time there was a marked shift in the distribution of wealth 
towards foreign-owned assets and a rise in the rate of unemployment.
The third phase was marked by the roughly steady growth of the United States, and the 
increase in the investment coefficient driven by the construction sector whose effects on total 
output were not fully felt due to a slowdown in productivity growth. At the same time the data 
indicates that part of the economic recovery was led by an expansion in the wage bill. The third 
phase can be termed a wage-led phase.
This paper analyses the trajectories of convergence and divergence between Puerto Rico 
and the economy of the United States, focusing on output convergence. It is structured in seven 
sections. Following the introduction, the first section provides an overall and general social and 
economic picture o f Puerto Rico in relation to the United States. The second section highlights 
the main features of the three phases o f convergence/di vergence for both economies. The third, 
fourth and fifth sections analyse in greater detail the convergence/divergence phases I to III 
trying to identify the possible elements that account for the narrowing or widening output gap. 
The sixth section examines the relationship between trade and convergence. The last section 
attempts to highlight key current trends that may impact on the process o f convergence o f Puerto 
Rico relative to the United States.
1. Puerto Rico in perspective: some basic comparisons with the United States
The Commonwealth o f Puerto Rico covers an area of 9,104 square kilometres with a 
population of 3.8 million inhabitants and occupies a central position among the islands of the 
West Indies in the northern Caribbean. Its GDP per capita is almost three times the Caribbean 
average and only surpassed by that o f the British Virgin Islands.
In comparison to the rest o f the United States, Puerto Rico stands as a state of median 
size in terms of population (ranking in 27th place when compared to the rest o f the states of the 
United States) and small in terms o f square kilometres (ranking in 49th place when compared to
4 The expression is from Stewart (2003).
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the rest o f the states o f the United States). It exhibits the greatest density of any state with the 
exception of New Jersey. Finally, in terms of its gross product Puerto Rico finds itself at the 
lower end o f the scale (ranking in 40th place when compared to the rest o f the states o f the United 
States) (see Table 2 below).
Manufacturing and services (and within services, finance, insurance and real estate 
services) are the main sectors of economic activity (contributing each 45% and 54% to GNP).5 
The agriculture sector has exhibited a small and declining share o f GNP reaching 1.4%. 
Correspondingly manufacturing, agriculture and services account for 14%, 1.9% and 31% of 
total employment respectively. In terms of its export structure, Puerto Rico has a leading edge in 
high technological products in the United States.
Table 2
The United States and Puerto Rico 
Selected social and economic statistics
Puerto Rico The United States
Population (000’) 3 863 (rank 27) 5 619.8 aJ
Size (Sq. Km) 9 104 (rank 49) 137 264 a/
Crude birth rate (2002) 15.1 14.0
Density (per Sq. Km) 425.2 (rank 3) 139.0 aI
Crude death rate (2002) (Per 1 000 inhabitants) 7.5 9.0
Infant mortality rate (Per 1 000 inhabitants) 8.0 9.0
Average life expectancy at birth 75 77
Unemployment rate (Dec. 2003) 11.4 6.0
GDP per capita (2004) 11 434.87 35 865 a/
Hourly average wage in manufacturing relative to 
the United States.
65-80 100
Average annual wages (2002) 19 728 36 219 b/
Productivity o f  non-farm employees o f Puerto Rico 
relative to the United States (2001) aI
60 100
Note: a/ refers to the median for the United States. B/ Does not take into account Puerto Rico of the United 
States Virgin Islands.
Source: UNCTAD (2002); Planning Board of Puerto Rico (2003)
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In terms o f convergence the data shows the existence o f absolute convergence for the 
federal states (that is, the states situated at the lower end of the output scale tend to grow faster 
than those situated at the higher end in order for the former to catch up with the latter).6 Puerto 
Rico however does not seem to conform to this norm.
Figure 1 above plots the relationship between real gross product measured in 1977 
million dollars and real product growth for the period 1977-2001 for all the different federal 
states and the Commonwealth o f Puerto Rico. The data show the existence of absolute 
convergence most clearly for the outward convergence frontier which includes Nevada and 
California at the extremes of the real gross product estimations. With a lower level of real gross 
product for 1977 than the simple average for the United States, Puerto Rico exhibits roughly the 
same rate o f growth as that o f the average for the United States. This shows that if  Puerto Rico 
continues to maintain its historical rates o f growth it will fail to generate a path of convergent 
growth with the United States.
Figure 2 above shows the same relationship as that o f Figure 1 for productivity of non­
farm employees and provides a similar diagnostic. The United States outward convergence 
productivity frontier is negatively shaped and the greater majority o f states are situated along the 
frontier reflecting the existence o f absolute convergence. Puerto Rico is the state that is the 
farthest away from the convergence frontier and one of the states combining the lowest 
productivity rate with the lowest rate of growth of output.
From a social point o f view the overall picture o f Puerto Rico’s standing relative to the 
rest o f the United States is somewhat different. Puerto Rico’s performance in terms of its social 
indicators suggests that it has reached similar standards as those prevailing in the United States 
in terms of crude birth and death rates per 1 000 inhabitants (15 and 8 per 1000 inhabitants, 
respectively). The infant mortality rates have also converged and stand at 8 per 1000 inhabitants 
for both economies (see Table 2 above). The rate of unemployment is much higher in Puerto 
Rico than in the United States and wages are markedly lower in Puerto Rico. Average annual 
wages for Puerto Rico in 2002 represent 56% of those earned in the United States (see Table 2 
above). Additional evidence provided by Stewart (2003) on the manufacturing sector show that 
hourly earnings in the manufacturing sector in Puerto Rico average between 65% and 80% of 
that o f the United States.
6 The literature distinguishes two concepts of convergence. These are termed sigma and beta convergence. Sigma 
convergence refers to a decline in the dispersion across a group of countries or regions over time. Sigma 
convergence can be measured by the standard deviation say of GDP per capita or by a coefficient of variation 
(defined as the ratio of the standard deviation over the mean). Beta convergence refers to the relationship between 
the rate of growth of a variable over time (say GDP) and the level of that variable for a given year. The existence of 
sigma convergence between a lower and higher level income countries implies that there is a process of catching-up 
between the former and the latter. That is, the lower income level countries grow at a faster rate than the higher level 
income ones. Sigma convergence is compatible with absolute convergence (see, Barro and Xala-i-Martin, 1995, 
pp.26-28 and 383-386). More recently some authors have explored the possibility o f simultaneous convergence and 
divergence. See, Elmslie and Milberg (1996) and Carter (2004). Lefort (2002) explains the lack of conditional 
convergence between Puerto Rico and the United States on the basis of differing steady-state value of per-capita 
income, which in turn is explained by the political status of Puerto Rico.
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Puerto Rico’s path o f output convergence/di vergence in relation to the United States is 
characterised by three phases. These are encapsulated in the time periods, 1947-1971; 1971-1986 
and 1986-2002 (see Table 3 below).
These three phases are illustrated in Figure 3 which shows the ratio of Puerto Rico’s GNP 
per capita relative to that o f the United States. Puerto Rico’s GNP represented 16% of that of the 
United States in 1947 and rose to 35% during Phase I (1947-1971). In 1986, at the end of Phase 
II (1971-1986), the GNP convergence indicators declined to 25% and in 2002, at the end of 
Phase III, (1986-2002) it had risen again to 33%. However, the convergence levels of Phase III 
never reached those attained in Phase I.
As expected Phase I was the one that recorded the highest rate o f growth followed by 
Phase III. Phase II registered the lowest rate of GNP growth. In terms o f volatility Figure 4, 
which shows a 10-year rolling coefficient of variation for GNP growth, also shows that Phase I 
was the least volatile and Phase II the one that exhibited the highest degree of volatility.
2. Puerto Rico’s convergent/divergent output trajectories
Table 3








GNP convergence mean a/ 16.7-34.9 34.9-25.4 25.4-32.2
GNP convergence standard deviation 2.4 2.8 1.3
(GDP-GNP)/GNP (In percentages) 0 23 47
Non-farm productivity convergence a/ n.a. 0.44-0.34 0.34-0.61
Government Consumption as % GNP 13.71 21.39 26.89
Gross fixed capital formation as % of GNP 21.0 17.0 21.9
External sales as % of GNP 53.1 68.3 90.3
Openness as % of GNP 130.8 177.3 244.3
Coefficient o f correlation between the rate 
o f growth of GNP and external sales
0.33 0.45 0.37
Note: GDP is the Gross Domestic Product and GNP is the Gross National Product. 
n.a.= not available, a/ Includes the first and last data points of the corresponding phases. 
















N.B.: Each observation is the average of a ten year period so that for example the observation for 1992 includes 1992 to 2002.
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During Phase I, the control o f economic and, in part, political affairs shifted from the 
United States to Puerto Rican officials. Following its consolidation at the end of the 1940s, the 
Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) dominated the political arena for over 28 years, which 
represents most of the period under consideration. Economic policy underwent through two 
stages7. The first (1940-1946) was marked by significant government intervention including the 
adoption of an import substitution strategy, the nationalisation o f selected firms, land reform 
efforts and government orientation of production (Padin, 2003). In 1947 this economic strategy 
gave way to one which privileged market mechanisms over State intervention. According to 
Padin (2003) current historiography is divided as to whether the change in economic strategy 
was driven by a class o f practical and independent managers or was imposed from the outside by 
external conditions.
Throughout this period ‘Operation Bootstrap’ guided the orientation of economic policy. 
8 As stated by Bonillaand Campos (1982, pp. 133-134):
“Bootstrap strategists argued that the intolerable population pressures on resources 
constituted the root obstacle to economic advance and the necessary modernization of 
Puerto Rico. Their prescription was to find a low-cost approach to channel the movement 
of redundant Puerto Rican workers abroad while drawing energetic entrepreneurs to the 
Island from the United States. The necessary economic and social operations envisioned 
in Bootstrap were to be carried out through the agency of a newly designed political 
structure, the commonwealth” 9
It was conceived as a two-stage strategy. In the first stage Puerto Rico would provide the 
social capital and the required infrastructure (Holbik and Swan, 1975; Cabán, 2002). These 
would be financed through the sale of bonds in the United States capital market and local taxes. 
Government expenditures and policies would provide, in turn, an important stimulus to the 
expansion of private investment, which took, in fact, a leading role during this phase. In the 
second stage, American firms would ‘be induced to locate through industrial sites through an 
elaborate incentives programme. The incentives included: tax concessions, grants, subsidised 
rentals and utility rates and low wage rates’ (Holbik and Swan, 1975, p. 16).
The first stage of the strategy was accompanied by significant government capital 
expenditures (education, transportation, housing, communications, irrigation) to provide a basis
3. Phase I (1947-1971): the initial convergent trajectory
7 In 1968, Luis Ferré o f  the N ew  Progressive Party broke the powerhold o f  the Partido Popular Democrático.
8 This strategy is also known as ‘industrialisation by invitation’ and was implemented under the governorship o f  
Luis Muñoz Marin. This approach was originally developed by Arthur Lewis who saw the need for industrialization 
as a response to the existence o f  surplus labor in agriculture. Due to the small size o f  the Caribbean markets, Lewis 
thought that industrialization could generate the demand necessary to absorb surplus labor i f  manufacturing output 
was oriented to both the domestic and export market and if  Caribbean countries formed a Customs Union. The 
strategy for industrialization was termed ‘industrialization by invitation’ because as pointed by Lewis “ ...what 
should rather be done is to try to persuade existing suppliers, with established distribution channels in Latin 
America, to open factories in the islands to supply their trade” (Ibid., p. 862).
9 The Commonwealth o f  Puerto Rico was established in 1952.
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for the development of private enterprise. 10 This policy continued well into the 1960s as the 
focus o f expenditure centred on roads and education (Holbik and Swan, 1975).
Stewart (2003) develops a similar argument: ‘Government-owned corporations in Puerto 
Rico had already been more prevalent than in the states through state ownership of the ports, 
power, industrial factory space (by the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company created in 
1942) 11 and agricultural land (by the Land Authority). Public ownership increased in the late 
1960s when the government acquired several large tourist hotels and sugar refineries in an 
attempt to avoid layoffs in these distressed industries. In 1974, the government acquired the local 
telephone network and major shipping interests (forming Navieras de Puerto Rico) in an attempt 
to improve service and reduce rates’.
Current government expenditure did not expand pari passu and remained at a low level. 
As shown in Table 3 above the ratio of government consumption to GDP reached 13.71% in 
Phase I and roughly doubled in phases II and III (21.39% and 26.89%). To put it in comparative 
perspective, both Puerto Rico and the United States had in 1947 roughly the same ratio of 
government expenditures to output (12% and 13%, respectively). In Phase I, the United States’ 
ratio of government consumption to output was systematically higher than that o f Puerto Rico. In 
Phases II and III the opposite phenomenon occurs (see Figure 6 above).
A similar conclusion is drawn computing the ratio o f transfer payments to personal 
income. This measure of the size and scope o f the government equalled 10% in 1947 and rose 5 
percentage points to 15% in 1971, that is, by the end o f Phase I. In Phase II the ratio doubled to 
30%. This provides a solid basis on which to argue that government intervention was more 
relevant to the Puerto Rican development model in Phase II rather than in Phase I.
Notwithstanding the arguments and evidence here presented it must be pointed out that 
the role of government during this period remains an issue of controversy.
G. Lewis (1963) has questioned the importance o f government intervention even during 
the so-called ‘statist intervention’ era stating that state enterprises accounted for only 1.2% of 
total net income and that to term the Puerto Rican model under the New Deal one of ‘State 
Socialism’ was ‘an extravagant example o f poetic license’ (G. Lewis, 1963).
It has also been stated that government institutions were too weak to fulfil their 
developmental role. This has been pointed out with respect to two of the leading sources o f long­
term capital for industry, the Government Development Bank (1942) and the Reconstruction
10 Holbik and Swan (1975, p.25) write: “Heavy expenditures were made in subsequent years on education, transport, 
housing, telephones, irrigation, and power. A  permanent improvement programme was established outside the 
budgetary process to ensure steady progress. B y 1967, the econom y had developed to the point that it could support 
a $69 m illion programme to finance expenditures o f  $14 m illion in industrial and tourist facilities, $11.4 million for 
new schools, $10.8 million for new housing, $9 million for land purchases, and $7.4. m illion for rural water 
supplies. In addition, a highway allocation o f  $7 million was to be lent by a N ew  York bank in a project that would 
reach $40 million, the largest single credit transaction ever handled by Puerto R ico”. The expenditure in 
infrastructure can also be seen as a component o f  social tranquility required for the success o f  Operation Bootstrap.
11 The Industrial Development Company was specifically charged with ‘promoting the industrialisation o f  Puerto 
R ico’. See Lewis (1949).
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Finance Corporation attest.12 According to Padin (2003, p.294) the Development Bank had a 
‘marginal role in financing public infrastructure’ Padin sustains that during the period 1950- 
1967, 75% of all long-term investment went into housing while the rest was distributed between 
the United States and the Puerto Rican government (15% and 17%). As a result, the financing of 
long-term investment was an insignificant part of the bank’s asset sheet and ‘the modest loan 
activity, 33%, o f its portfolio shows no clear commitment to industrialisation - a  mere 16% of 
bank assets were in the form of industrial development finance, the purported priority o f the 
government’s development program’. (Ibid, p. 294)
Besides government intervention, the development of private enterprise was further 
enhanced by a policy of tax incentives deliberately aimed at encouraging domestic investment. 
One such example is the 1948 law granting tax incentives.
The 1948 law exempted new industries established in 1947 from income, property and 
excise taxes in Puerto Rico. The level o f exemption granted was established at 100% until 1959 
and 75%, 50% and 25% in the following three years (Lewis, 1949). As Lewis saw it the law 
benefited only: ‘(a) Puerto Rican capitalists who establish new industries; (b) U.S. capitalists 
who move from the U.S. to Puerto Rico; (c) by a special provision o f the U.S. but who derives 
80% of his income from Puerto Rico, including 50% from active conduct o f a business in Puerto 
Rico (probably a rare species)....Tax exemption thus benefits the small American capitalist who 
is willing to transfer to Puerto Rico, and the large American capitalist who is willing to use his 
Puerto Rico profits to expand his assets in Puerto Rico. But it would not help a large American 
corporation which built a branch plant in Puerto Rico and wished to use the income to declare 
dividends to its American shareholders’. Thus the tax laws and incentives benefited domestic 
investment.











The effect of these policies is clearly seen in the trend of the investment coefficient which 
stood at 8% of GDP in 1940 and rose steadily to 31% in 1971 (see Table 3)13 and which in fact 
acted as the main force behind the process o f economic growth
Eye inspection o f Figures 3 and 5 reveals that the different phases o f convergence 
correspond closely to the variations in the investment coefficient. The results o f a simple 
cointegration analysis between our convergence variable and the investment coefficient validate 
the existing strong linkage between both variables (see Table 4 below).
Table 4 
Puerto Rico
Cointegration analysis of convergence and the formation of fixed gross capital
1947-2002
Descriptive statistical analysis
Mean Coefficient of variation Coefficient o f correlation
LC 3.2 0.06 0.61
LGFCF 2.9 0.11
Unit root tests
Lag Test statistic ADF 
95% critical value
LC 5 -1.90 -3.50
LGFCF 5 -1.82 -3.50
ALC 3 -2.31* -2.92
ALGFCF 5 -3.36 -2.92
Cointegration test results
Ho Ha Optimal lag Johansen Statistic 95% CV 90% CV
r=0 1=1 4 15.83 15.81 13.81
r=<0 1=2 4 7.78 9.16 7.53
Cointegrating equation
LC = 1.69 + 0.56 LGFCF 
(0.36) (0.12)
Note:LC = logarithm o f  convergence.
LGFCF= logarithm o f  gross fixed capital formation.
* =  significant at the 95% confidence level.
ADF= augmented Dickey Fuller statistic.
The Dickey Fuller regressions testing for unit roots contain a trend when applied to variables in levels. 
A = first difference.
H0 and Ha= null and alternative hypothesis.
CV= critical value.
Source: On the basis o f  official sources.
Cointegration provides an empirical analysis o f long-run economic relations that take into 
account the potential non-stationary properties o f the data. That is, it captures the fact that the 
time series processes may not have a constant mean or a bounded variance. The standard method 
to allow for non-stationarity in the estimation of long-run economic relations is to apply
13 Lefort pp.4-5 also notes the rise in investment although he attributes it to the importance o f  external sources in 
capital formation which was complemented by domestic capital.
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cointegration methods. The first step of this method requires verifying that the relevant variables 
have compatible orders o f integration.14 This task is here done through the application o f the 
conventional and the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests.
Once such compatibility is checked, the next step consists o f estimating the number of 
stationary linear combinations (so-called cointegration vectors) of the relevant variables. If no 
such combination is identified the variables are said to be not cointegrated; in other words there 
is no stable long-run linear relation between them.
On the other hand, if  at least one such combination exists, the variables are said to be 
cointegrated and the estimated coefficients are interpreted as the long-run linear multipliers of 
the relevant regressors. To estimate the number, if  any, o f such cointegrating vectors we applied 
Johansen’s methods. 15 It is necessary to first specify a vector autoregressive (VAR) system 
with the set of relevant variables and then to estimate the number of long-run equilibrium 
relationships between them.
The results presented in Table 4 show that both the convergence and the investment 
coefficient ratios series are correlated. The correlation coefficient is 0.61. In addition there is a 
long-run relationship between both variables as the Johansen Statistic derived from running the 
cointegrating equation between convergence and gross capital formation could not reject the 
existence of a long-run relationship at the 5% confidence level. The results also show that an 
increase of 1% in the investment coefficient ratio leads to a half percentage point increase in the 
convergence ratio.
The dynamics underpinning the behaviour of the investment coefficient are explained 
mainly by construction activities and to a lesser extent by machinery and equipment. For the 
period 1947-1971 construction activities represented 61% of total investment while machinery 
and equipment stood at 33% o f the total.
The decomposition of construction into its public and private component shows that the 
government accounted for 19% of total investment in construction whereas 35% of the total was 
in private hands (see Table 5 below).
While Operation Bootstrap managed to implement its first stage during this period, its 
second stage was only partially fulfilled.
Padin (2003) notes the absence of foreign direct investment at least during the first 
decade of Phase I. In this regard, he states (Ibid, pp.285-286): ‘US firms attracted to Puerto Rico 
in the 1950s were relatively small, labor intensive operations in declining sectors with a grim 
future in the United States...The turn to private foreign direct investment was initially so 
uncertain that each new plant was celebrated with the orchestrated fanfare o f a development 
agency fearful of losing public support for its efforts.’
14 The order of integration of a stochastic variable X(t) is defined as the number of times it must be first-differenced 
to obtain a stationary series.
15 Simple introductions to unit-root testing and cointegration analysis may be found in Cuthbertson (1992) and 
Charemza and Deadman (1992) and Enders (1995).
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For the following decade Morley (1980, p. 183) stresses that, “The number of new 
factories in operation as a result o f ‘Operation Bootstrap’ grew from 548 in 1957-1958 to 1,003 
in 1964-1965 and then jumped dramatically to 1,674 in 1967-1968 when heavy capital 
investments were beginning to establish a foothold in the Puerto Rican economy”.
It is this latter period o f heavy capital investments, which matured in Phase II and 
brought about the consequences generally associated with ‘industrialisation by invitation’ 
namely, capital-intensive technology and assembly plant industrialisation that translated into low 
employment creation growth and weak linkages between United States subsidiary firms and the 
rest of the Puerto Rican economy. This is reflected in the fact that unemployment declined from 
1960 to 1969 and began to increase thereafter.
The take-off in foreign investment at the end of the first phase responded no doubt to the 
change in the tax legislation as the 1948 act was replaced with a new and more comprehensive 
tax exemption act in 1963 and later in 1969 by the increase in the flexibility in the granting of tax 
incentives given to the government. The 1963 tax act granted exemptions o f up to 100% on 
earnings ranging for a period o f 10 to 17 years. Also the tax exemption period could be expanded 
when a firm opted for 50% exemption on earnings combined with full exemption on local taxes.
This argument is reinforced by indirect empirical evidence that shows that foreign direct 
investment flows had only partially expanded during this period. If as a general rule profit 
repatriation is a percentage o f foreign direct investment flows and if  the repatriation of profits is 
measured by the difference between the gross domestic product (GDP) (income produced in 
Puerto Rico) and the gross national product (GNP) (income available in Puerto Rico) then it can 
be easily verified that foreign direct investment began to fully expand from the middle of the 
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Construction 66.12 67.40 64.65 53.54 50.03 53.00 65.49 60.66 50.33
Private firms 30.82 40.48 32.53 22.25 23.81 33.53 34.53 28.10 24.41
Public firms 22.22 16.61 19.75 22.32 16.75 10.90 19.59 21.09 17.11
Government 13.06 10.31 12.37 8.98 9.48 8.57 11.28 11.47 8.81
Central (1) 10.92 7.20 8.56 5.65 6.90 6.19 8.91 7.59 6.16
Machinery and 
equipment
33.89 32.60 35.36 46.46 49.97 47.00 34.51 39.34 49.67
Private firms 27.75 29.45 31.32 41.78 46.96 45.17 29.12 34.98 46.35
Public firms 3.98 1.30 1.87 2.05 1.19 0.57 3.14 1.95 1.38
Government 2.17 1.85 2.17 2.62 1.82 1.27 2.26 2.42 1.94
Central (1) 1.99 1.57 1.75 2.10 1.50 0.97 2.06 1.91 1.59
Source: On the basis o f information provided by the Planning Board o f Puerto Rico
More precisely if  the proxy for profit repatriation (i.e., the difference between GDP and 
GNP) is measured as a percentage o f GNP, it is seen that throughout the 1940s and 1950s the 
ratio was negative standing at 6% of GNP on average. It turned positive in 1960 and rose steadily 
throughout the period. During the 1960s the ratio equalled 4.4% on average. In the following 
three decades, the difference o f GDP and GNP to GNP increased to 17%, 37% and 48%, 
respectively. In 2002, it again rose to 57%.
The scant empirical data available on foreign direct investment validates this hypothesis. 
Between 1960 and 1967 total United States investment in Puerto Rico increased from 1.4 to 5 
billion and continued to expand to 10, 15 and 20 billion in 1973, 1976 and 1978, respectively 
(Bonilla and Campos, 1982, p. 135 and p. 136).
Finally it is noteworthy to reiterate that this was not an export-led or trade-led growth 
period. In fact imports and especially exports expressed as a percentage of GNP stagnated 
showing little correlation among GNP growth, exports or openness. Total external sales as a 
percentage o f GNP increased from 53.1% in Phase I to 68% and 90% in Phases II and III (see 
Table 3 above). For its part the simple correlation coefficient between the rate of growth of GNP 
and total external sales shows a higher degree of association in Phase II than in Phase I (0.45 and 
0.33, respectively).
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Phase II represents from our point of view the full application o f the Arthur Lewis Model 
termed ‘Industrialisation by Invitation’ to Puerto Rico. During this period the three elements of 
industrialization by invitation, namely, fiscal incentives, foreign direct investment (FDI) 
promotion and attraction, and a trade policy oriented to develop selected targeted industries were 
articulated into a full-fledged development strategy.
The attraction o f foreign direct investment was directly tied to a policy o f federal and 
local fiscal incentives17. At the local level during Phase II, the Industrial Incentives Act (1978) 
sought to homogeneize the existing Puerto Rican tax legislation with that of the rest of the 
United States. This meant the elimination of the regime of local tax exemptions, which had been 
in place since the late 1940s and which had provided a stimulus to the expansion of domestic 
investment. More importantly the 1978 Act encouraged the development o f the services sector 
by granting a tax break of 50% to export-oriented service firms engaged in ‘distribution, 
consulting, accounting, banking and computer systems’. According to Dietz (2001) ‘this 
contributed to the shift in overall production toward services and the emergence of...the ‘high 
finance’ stage o f industrialisation.’
4. Phase II (1971-1986): the divergent phase16
16 During this phase the Partido Popular Democrático returned to power in 1973 and ruled until 1976 when it was 
defeated by the Partido Nuevo Progresista (1976-1985).
17 Arthur Lewis thought that the main incentive to attract foreign capital to the Caribbean was lower labor costs. 
Lewis sought to supplement this by a policy of fiscal incentives. The protectionist side to this development model 
came at a later stage. In fact, Lewis, rather than arguing in favor of protection from imports stated the case for export 
subsidies. As he put it (Ibid, p. 886): “Most of the industries will have to export, and if they are to do this, they must 
















While fiscal incentives began to be put in place in the latter part of the 1940s, as 
mentioned earlier they did not necessarily fulfil their function in stimulating foreign investment 
or in attracting United States-based firms. An additional indication o f this is the number o f times 
the tax exemptions were amended (1948,1954,1963, 1978).
At the federal level, Section 931 of the United States internal revenue tax code in force 
until 1976, allowed United States corporations to ‘exclude their profits from any US tax liability 
on so-called possessions income, as long as these profits were not repatriated to the US during 
the ‘life’ o f the corporation’. As also noted by Dietz (2001), this law ‘led to ‘ghost’ closings of 
corporations at the end of their Puerto Rican exemption period so that profits could be 
repatriated. These firms would be then reconstituted with a new exemption period in Puerto Rico 
until a subsequent ghost liquidation took place so that profits could again be remitted tax free’.
The Tax Reform Act of 1975 replaced Section 931 with Section 936. It provided a tax 
credit “equal to the full amount of the United States corporate income tax liability on income 
generated by production, trade or investment activities o f an active business in a United States 
possession”. This incentive “sheltered a large proportion of corporate income taxes generated by 
profits of production facilities located in Puerto Rico. The intent was to promote development of 
the Puerto Rico economy and the reduced costs also encouraged production of materials for 
export”18. Investment income was also exempted from the federal income tax provided that at 
least three-quarters of all profits came from trade or production activities and provided that the 
income was earned and invested in Puerto Rico.
Section 936 was without doubt a significant tax incentive act as it was estimated that 
more than 90% of those corporations that qualified for tax exemptions under Section 936 were 
located in Puerto Rico. However the law also led to a concentration of industry in manufacturing 
and pharmaceuticals. In fact the drug and pharmaceuticals industry received half of the tax 
benefits granted by section 936 of the tax reform act o f 1975.
For all purposes the combination o f the Industrial Incentives Act (1978) and the entry in 
force o f Section 936 o f the 1976 Tax Reform Act curtailed the expansion of domestic investment 
and encouraged capital outflows. Nationals saw the share o f non-local direct investment increase 
from 26% to 44% between 1970 and 1980. Also the difference between GDP (income produced 
in Puerto Rico) and GNP (income available in Puerto Rico) began to widen substantially during 
this phase. On average in Phase I, the difference between GDP and GNP in terms of GNP was 
nil. It increased steadily to 23% and 47% in Phases II and III (see Figure 7 above).
At the same time the development o f the pharmaceutical industry, which is highly capital 
intensive did not favour the creation of employment. Indeed it was estimated in 1987 that the 
level o f employment in pharmaceutical companies represented less than 3% of the total 
employment generated in Puerto Rico. Also they represented less than 18% of the total 
employment generated by companies benefiting from the tax exemptions granted in Section 936.
18 See, The Urban Institute. Targeting Export Markets for Puerto Rico. 1997.
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These conditions set the stage for a period of economic decline and lack o f convergence, 
the hallmark o f Phase II, and which was aggravated by the first oil-OPEC shock19. During part of 
this period the rate o f growth of Puerto Rico decreased relative to Phase I in spite o f the fact that 
the United States’ rate o f growth was actually increasing. As shown in Table 3, the rate of 
growth of the United States increased from 5.2% and 8.5% in Phases I and II whereas that of 
Puerto Rico decreased from 8.3% to 6.2%. This is also shown in greater detail in Figure 11 and 
in the econometric results derived from running a rolling regression o f Puerto Rico’s growth rate 
on that of the United States. Choosing a window size o f 10 observations, it is shown that the 
coefficient has a clear inflection point in 1971 and is negative, indicating an opposite movement 
in the rate of growth o f Puerto Rico and that of the United States from 1971 to 1979 (see Figure 
8 below).
Figure 8: Coefficient of US growth and its two*S.E. bands based on rolling OLS
It is noteworthy to remember that the absence o f convergence was not uniquely in 
relation to the United States but also to other countries.
Padin (2003) notes the start o f a marked cleavage between Puerto Rico and the four Asian 
NICS (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan), which provided, according to some 
authors (Baumol and Wolff, 1996), the basis on which to compare the post WWII development 
o f Puerto Rico. Table 6 below shows that the GNP per capita growth and GDP growth o f Puerto 
Rico was roughly in line with that of the rest o f the NICs during the period 1960 to 1970 (5.9% 
and 7.1% for Puerto Rico and 6.6% and 8.7% on average for Puerto Rico and the NICs). 
Contrarily in the following decade the rate o f economic growth o f Puerto Rico fell below the 
average by more than four percentage points (3.0% for Puerto Rico and 7.6% for Puerto Rico 
and the NICs on average).




Average annual growth for Puerto Rico and the Newly Industrialised Countries




Puerto Rico 5.9 7.1 3.0
Singapore 5.5 8.8 8.5
Hong Kong 8.7 10 9.9
Taiwan 6.3 9.2 8
South Korea 6.4 8.6 8.6
Average 6.6 8.7 7.6
Difference in the average rate growth o f GDP per 
capita o f Puerto Rico and CARICOM
n.a. 3.2 0.97
Latin America b/ n.a. 5.4 4.8
Latin America c/ n.a. 5.0 4.2
Note: a/GNP in the case o f Puerto Rico; b/refers to weighted GDP; c/unweighted GDP. 
Source: Padin (2003); INTAL (2001).
Another way to approach this phenomenon is by looking at the opposite case, that is, by 
comparing Puerto Rico to countries, which on average have experienced relatively lower rates of 
growth or levels of income. In this case the lower growth or income level countries would 
experience a process of convergence to the growth or income trajectory of Puerto Rico.
A comparison of Puerto Rico’s GDP per capita growth to that of Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) economies shows that the differences in their respective rates o f growth declined 
from 3.2% in 1960-1970 to 0.97 for 1970-1982.
As mentioned previously this period o f lack of convergence was also one o f economic 
decline. In the early 1970s productivity and the formation of gross capital dipped. Gross 
formation o f fixed capital as a percentage of GNP fell from the overall high of 30% reached in 
Phase I to 13% at the end of Phase II. The economic decline is also present when comparing the 
rate o f growth of Puerto Rico to that o f Latin America. Puerto Rico experienced a rate of 
economic growth higher than that o f Latin America in the 1960s and a comparatively lower rate 
of growth in the following decade (7.1% and 5.0%; 3.0% and 4.8%, respectively).
In a similar vein, the rate of growth o f productivity showed a downward trend (see Table 
3 above and Figure 9 below). On average, the rate o f growth of productivity declined from 









Rate of growth of productivity 
1947-2002
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Finally the level of employment stagnated and the rate of unemployment rose 
substantially. Phase I saw the creation of 152 000 jobs while Phase II saw the creation of only 92 
000 jobs. Moreover the coefficient of variation of the level of employment decreased from 0.09 
in Phase I to 0.02 in Phase II. The absence of a dynamic labour market was clearly reflected in a 
doubling of the rate of unemployment. In 1970, the rate of unemployment reached 10% and 
doubled to 21% in 1985 (that is, at the end of Phase II) (see Table 7 below).
Part o f the socially negative effects o f the stagnation in employment and the increase in 
the rate o f unemployment were mitigated by the important increase in federal transfer payments. 
Net transfers to the private sector rose from 13% to 27% of GNP between 1971 and 1977.
Table 7 
Puerto Rico 








Employment (000’) 597.2 734.7 1028.6
Employment creation (000’) 127 99 372
Productivity growth % 5.8 2.6 2.0
Unemployment rate % 10.3 21.4 13.1
Net transfer of funds as % of 
GNP
15 25-30 20
Source: On the basis of official data
5. Phase III (1986-2002): the return to convergence20
The third phase, which started in 1986, is marked by a return to a convergence path with 
the rest o f the United States. This is partly explained by favourable external conditions that 
prevailed during the second half o f the 1980s and throughout the 1990s.
According to the cycle dating procedure of the National Bureau o f Economic Research, 
the United States experienced an expansion in its cycle from the fourth quarter o f November 
1982 to the third quarter of July 1990. From the third quarter o f July 1990 until the first quarter 
of March 1991, the United States economy contracted but then recovered to register an 
unprecedented period o f economic expansion and stability that lasted from the first quarter of 
March 1991 until the first quarter of March 2001. The following recession lasted from the first 
quarter o f March 2001 until the fourth quarter o f November 2001.
20 The Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) ruled from 1985 until 1992. The Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP) 
remained in power from 1992 until 2000 when Sila Calderón of the PPD was elected to the governorship of Puerto 












Overall, from 1986 until 2002, the United States experienced 16 months in a 
contractionary phase of the business cycle (counting from peak to trough) that represents 22% of 
the total months included in the sample and indicating that during Phase III, Puerto Rico 
benefited from the favourable growth conditions in the United States21.
In addition by breaking GNP down into its different components it is seen that in Phase 
III, the gross formation of fixed capital as a percentage of GNP reversed its downward trend of 
Phase II, rising from 17% in 1986 to 30% of GNP in 1999 and settling at 28% o f GNP in 2002. 
The effect o f investment on GNP was somewhat offset by the fall back in productivity. Indeed as 
Table 3 shows, Phase III o f the convergence path is the lowest in terms o f productivity growth 
(6%, 3% and 2% for Phases I, II and III). Furthermore as visual inspection of Figure 8 above 
shows, productivity growth is clearly marked by three plateaux, which clearly correspond to the 
three convergence phases.
The slowdown in productivity growth reflected the failure of output to increase jointly 
with employment, which registered the highest expansion during the period under consideration 
(see Figure 9 and Table 8). The increase in employment reflected the dynamism of the 
construction and the government sectors. Between 1990 and 2001, employment rose from 963 
000 to 1 157 000 reflecting the creation of 194 000 jobs. Of this total, the construction and public 
services sectors accounted for 38%. In turn the activity in the construction sector was oriented 
towards residential investment in the private realm and government and municipalities in the 
public realm.
Table 8













Agriculture 36 3.7 22 1.9 -14 -7.2
Manufacturing 168 17.5 159 13.7 -9 -4.6
Construction 55 5.7 85 7.3 30 15.4
Transport and public 
utilities
60 6.2 56 4.8 -4 -2.1
Commerce 185 19.2 242 20.9 57 29.2
Financial services 30 3.1 40 3.5 10 5.1
Public services 206 21.4 251 21.7 45 23.1
Others 222 23.1 302 26.1 80 41.0
Total 962 100 1157 100 195 100
Source: On the basis of the Economist Intelligence Unit and official data
21 Determining whether there is business cycle synchronisation between the United States and Puerto Rico would 
require a comprehensive and detailed data set (such as for example a long series of quarterly GDP or GNP) that is 








1 9 4 7 -2 0 0 2
Years
29
The result of an increase in employment and the slowdown in productivity is the rising 
trend in the wage share. The wage share stagnated at 30% of GNP during most of Phase I rising 
to 38% at the end o f this phase. In Phase II the wage share stood at 40% of GNP registering little 
deviation from that average. In Phase III, the wage share expanded substantially to reach 57% of 
GNP in 2002. Through national accounting identities the wage share can be broken down into 
the product o f the real wage and the labor output ratio.
That is, by accounting identity (abstaining from intermediate inputs and indirect taxes) 
conventions nominal output equals:
(1) PY = wbY + rPK
Where,
P = price level 
Y = level of output 
b = the labor/output ratio 
r = profit rate 
K = capital stock
Dividing Eq. (1) by PY it is obtained that,
(2) 1 = (wbY)/(PY) + (rPK/PY) O  1= (w/p) b + rK/Y
According to Eq (2), the normalised level of output is equal to the sum of the product of 
the real wage and the labour output ratio (the wage share) and the profit share. In the particular 
example of Puerto Rico, the empirical evidence available shows that the increase in the wage 
share resulted from both an increase in the labor/output ratio and the rise in the real wage (see 
Figure 11 above). At the same time the increase in the wage share meant the decline in the profit 
share. Thus in terms of distribution Phase III was favourable towards the salary earning segment 
of the population. As a result of the above reasoning, the convergence in Phase III is actually the 
product o f what is termed conventionally a wage-led regime.
In analysing Phase III it is important to note that it is by far the most ‘open’ phase. 
External sales as a percentage rose from 60% to 90% of GNP in Phases II and III. Openness 
defined as the sum of external sales and purchases as a percentage o f GNP increased from 177% 
to 244% of GNP between Phases I and II. However, the correlation between the rate of growth 
of export and that o f GNP is weak suggesting a weak degree o f association between both 
variables. The simple correlation coefficient is 0.33 for Phase III as compared to 0.45 for Phase
II.
6. Trade and convergence
One of the key variables identified in the literature (see Baumol and Wolff, 1996) as 
promoting convergence is trade openness. As noted previously, external sales and purchases
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have increased significantly during the period under study, and especially in the third phase of 
the convergence trajectory.
Overall available data on exports and imports for 1993 to 2002 indicate that Puerto Rico 
has registered a widening global trade surplus. In 1993 the trade surplus was equal to $3.6 billion 
increasing to $12.4 billion in 2002. This is due mainly to its standing trade surplus with the 
United States since the available trade data show a deficit with the rest o f foreign countries (see 
Table 9 below).
However it should be taken into account that Puerto Rican authorities provide two ways 
of capturing trade data, origin of movement, which is captured by customs data, and post of final 
shipment. The customs data are not necessarily the most accurate way to record exports and 
imports as they only record data based on customs districts and port.
These data may underestimate exports since exports that originate in Puerto Rico may 
actually clear customs in another state, say Miami, and be recorded as an export of that state. As 
an example, at the aggregate level registered exports equal 5,363 million while exports based on 
an origin of movement criterion are equal to 9,89622 . That is, the first method underestimates 
the value o f exports by $4,533 million. At the individual country level the error becomes greater 
as the distance between Puerto Rico and a partner country increases. As an example, in the case 
of Great Britain, registered exports are equal to $731,000. On an origin o f movement criterion, 
exports to the United Kingdom amount to $1.5 billion (see Table 10 below).23
22 Registered exports include goods produced in Puerto Rico and exported from Puerto Rico and goods that were not 
produced in Puerto Rico and were exported from Puerto Rico. The computations could have also used direct exports 
which are goods produced in Puerto Rico and exported from Puerto Rico. The difference is equal to US$4,829 
million. See Selected Statistics on Puerto Rico’s External Trade 2002. Puerto Rico Planning Board (January 2003).
23 This particular way of recording data, which is the ‘standard way’ of recording data, and the absence of a long run 
export data set (in terms of levels and its composition) constitute an important impediment to carry out an analysis in 
trade structure between the United States and Puerto Rico.
Table 
Puerto ï




tries; number of visitors and tourist expenditure 
002
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Trade balance 3404.9 5098.4 4994.7 3883.5 2559.4 8475.4 9602.4 11422.9 17751.5 18187.7
United States 5713.8 7815.1 8948.8 8239.3 7869.5 14171.5 15399.3 18683.9 25781.1 27178.4
Virgin Islands 126.7 -1.7 -142.1 -229.5 -352.8 -506.6 -494.8 -589.6 -700.6 -617.4
Foreign Countries -2435.7 -2715 -3811.9 -4126.3 -4957.2 -5189.5 -5302.1 -6671.4 -7329 -8373.3
Africa -83.3 -91.9 -112 -159.4 -177.8 -187.8 -92.7 -180.3 -68.9 -64.3
Central America -49.1 -39.7 -62.9 -49.5 -24.3 -16 -30.8 -41.9 -66.4 -57
North America -241.4 -90 -224.8 -197.6 -216.1 -225.1 -510.7 -362.9 -336 -232
South America -1056.9 -970.9 -738.5 -868.3 -1091.8 -997 -856.6 -1240 -1122 -856.3
Asia -1020 -1311.1 -1776.7 -1657.9 -1576.9 -1282 -1484.2 -1675.6 -1299.9 -1261
Australia and the Pacific -6.1 24.5 1.5 17.6 2.6 5.2 6.1 16.7 52.3 10.7
Caribbean -83.5 47.3 64.1 -60.8 -236.6 -79.4 -82.9 -60.9 -255.6 -280.7
Europe 104.5 -283.2 -962.6 -1150.3 -1609.4 -2407.4 -2250.3 -3126.6 -4232.6 -5632.7
Number of visitors 3869 4022.6 4086.6 4110.2 4349.7 4670.8 4221.3 4566 4907.8 4364.1
Tourist expenditure 1628.1 1728.3 1827.6 1898.3 2046.3 2232.9 2128.5 2387.9 2728.1 2486.4
Source: Puerto Rico Planning Board (2003)
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While origin o f movement is generally taken to be the more accurate method to compute 
exports it is far from being a flawless method. As Coughlin and Pollard indicate (2001, p.26):
“The MISER export data are regarded as the best available data source for state exports; 
however, these data have some well known weaknesses. One potential important problem 
is that the identified export state may not be the state o f manufacture, but rather the state 
of a broker (or wholesaler or the state where a number o f shipments were consolidated. ”
In what follows, trade flows are computed and are presented on an origin of movement 
basis when the required data is available.24 Origin o f movement data is provided by the 
Massachusetts Institute of Social and Economic Research (MISER) using the SIC classification 
and up to six digits o f the harmonized code system. Customs district data is provided by the 
United States Trade Representative using SIC and SITC trade data classification and also up to 
10 digits of the harmonized code system25.
24 The MISER data does not provide imports based on origin o f  movement by state. An alternative to computing 
exports on an origin o f  movement or port o f  final shipment is to use the exporter location criterion but is subject to 
the same caveats as those pointed for the origin o f  movement. Using exporter location, N ew  York appears as one o f  
the largest exporters o f  agricultural products (see, MISER State Export Data Explanation provided in the MISER 
website).
25 In the trade data presented in the export and import tables below the document used customs data and when 


































Source: Puerto Rico Planning Board (2002)
Note: export shares were computed following the origin o f  movement criterion. The trade intensity index is 
computed follow ing the methodology o f  Anderson and Norheim (1993). See also, Grimwade (1996). The trade 
intensity index is equal to the ratio o f  the share o f  a country’s exports going to its partner country divided by the 
partner’s country share in world imports. The trade intensity ratio is used generally to measure the degree o f  regional 
integration o f  two trade partners. In this document the index is used in a broader perspective.
As shown in Table 11, the main trading partner is the United States (77% of the total) 
followed by four European countries (United Kingdom, Germany, Holland, and Japan 
representing 3.1%, 2.1%, 1.9%, 1.5% of the total) ) and the Dominican Republic (1.4% of the 
total). At the product level Puerto Rico’s exports are concentrated in pharmaceutical products, 
computer equipment and electrical machinery representing, in 2002, 70%, 9% and 2% of the
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total. Computer equipment and pharmaceutical products are considered manufactures with high 
skill and technology intensity while electrical machinery is viewed as a manufacture with 
medium skill and technology intensity. In the past two decades, these products have combined a 
rapid growth rate (the average annual growth rate of computer exports was 12% while those of 
pharmaceutical products and machinery were 12% and 16%) with a high share of world exports.
Excluding fuels, which represent 5% of its total imports, Puerto Rico’s import structure is 
also biased towards high and medium technology products. The main import products are 
chemicals followed by computer and electronic products, transportation equipment and 
machinery (43%, 7%, 8% and 4%).
The issue of whether Puerto Rican exports have contributed to growth and to 
convergence is not a straightforward issue or one that has been explored to its full extent. A 
common voiced concern is that the existing system of federal and local tax incentives led to the 
establishments of firms that specialised in final assembly operations adding little value added to 
the production process.
Within this context Dusenbury and Liner (1997) obtained the export intensity index in 
manufacturing o f Puerto Rico relative to that of the United States and compared it to the value 
added index of the manufacturing sector of Puerto Rico relative to that o f the United States. The 
export intensity index, say for the United States, was measured by the ratio of the value of 
exports for a given group of commodities relative to the domestic product. For its part the value 
added index say for Puerto Rico was proxied by the ratio o f the contribution o f the 
manufacturing sector to the gross domestic product to total manufacturing sales.
Table 12
Value added of the manufacturing sector in Puerto Rico relative to that
of the United States 
1993 -1 9 9 5




Industrial machinery 1.99 0.66
Tobacco manufactures 2.66 0.64
Textile, mill products 1.98 1.03
Lumber and wood products n.a. 0.74
Instruments and related products 2.32 0.69
Transportation equipment n.a. 1.29
Chemicals and allied products 6.79 1.09
Food and kindred products 2.62 1.05
Electronic equipment n.a. 0.61
All manufacturing industry n.a. 0.97
Source: Dusenbury and Liner (1997)
Their results show that in general the discrepancies in the value added indices between 
Puerto Rico and the United States are small and of the order o f 1% to 6%. Contrarily the
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differences in the export index are for the most part significantly greater for Puerto Rico than for 
the United States (at least 50% higher for Puerto Rico). The conclusion of Dusenbury and Linder 
(1997, p.70) is that: ‘manufacturing exports are, indeed, making a contribution to the Puerto Rico 
economy that is significantly greater than the contribution that manufacturing exports make to 
the economy of the U.S. as a whole’. In this sense the development o f manufacturing exports is 
an underpinning force of convergence towards the United States (see Table 12 above).
Additional preliminary evidence linking exports to growth and convergence was derived 
by applying econometric techniques to test the existence o f a long-run relationship between the 
GNP per capita in Puerto Rico and the gross formation of fixed capital, exports and the GDP per 
capita for the United States. The procedure followed roughly the same steps as those used in the 
econometric for a long-run relationship between the gross formation of fixed capital and the 
convergence ratio (see Table 2). In this case, an over identifying restriction was also incorporated 
to test the significance of exports in the cointegrating equation.
The results presented in Table 13 below indicate at this preliminary stage that the variable 
external sales used as a proxy for total exports is not a significant variable and is not related in 
the long run to Puerto Rico’s GNP per capita. As found earlier the gross formation of fixed 
capital and especially the United States GDP seem to play a more fundamental role.
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Table 13 I 
Cointegration analysis of GDP per capita, investment and exports
1947-2002
Unit root tests
Lag Test statistic ADF 
95% critical value
LPRGNP 2 -0.54 -3.50
LUS GDP 5 -3.51* -3.50
LGFFC 3 -2.40 -3.50
LX 2 -1.03 -3.50
ALPRGNP 0 -2.99* -2.92
ALUSGDP 3 -3.00* -2.92
ALGFFC 0 -4.66* -2.92
ALX 1 -6.49* -2.92
Cointegration test results
Ho Ha Optimal lag Johansen Statistic 95% CV 90% CV
r=0 r=l 2 27.4 28.27 25.80
r=<l r=2 2 16.3 22.04 19.86
r=<2 r=3 2 12.9 15.87 13.81
r=<3 r=4 2 3.98 9.16 7.5
Cointegrating equation
LPR = -2.5 + 0.91 LUS + 0.29LGFFC -  0.009LX 
(0.30) (0.18) (0.078) (0.24)
X 2 i = 0.0016
Note:
LPRGNP = logarithm o f  GNP per capita o f  Puerto Rico.
LUS = logarithm o f  GNP per capita o f  THE United States.
LGFCF = logarithm o f  gross fixed capital formation.
LX = logarithm o f  exports.
* = significant at the 95% confidence level.
ADF= augmented Dickey Fuller statistic.
The D ickey Fuller regressions testing for unit roots contain a trend when applied to variables in levels. 
A = first difference.
H0 and Ha = null and alternative hypothesis.
CV= critical value.
X2 1 = Chi Square Statistic testing the null hypothesis that LX is equal to 0.
Source: On the basis o f  official sources.
7. Puerto Rico and the future path of convergence towards the United States
During the last years of Phase III the tax legislation underwent important changes whose 
effects are not yet visible for the last years o f the sample but which could have an important 
effect on the convergence trajectory o f Puerto Rico to the United States.
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Since 1993 the United States has gradually sought to suppress the special and differential 
tax treatment received by Puerto Rico. In 1993 the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act imposed 
cutbacks in the programme of tax incentives for new investments by retaining the investment tax 
credit while imposing limits on the income-based tax credit. The latter decreased by 5 percentage 
points a year in 1995 -from  60% of profits in 1994 to 40% of qualified labour costs in 1998.
In 1996, Section 936 was repealed through the Small Business Job Protection Act and 
granted a phase-out of 10 years for current beneficiaries. The authorities have proposed an 
amendment to Section 956 of the federal tax code, which would allow controlled foreign 
corporations (CFC) to repatriate 90% o f their profits to related or parent operations in the United 
States tax-free. The income-based option of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act will remain 
at its 1998 level. The reduction of tax incentives is estimated to increase from $111 million in 
1996 to $2,686 in 2006 (Dusenbury and Lines, 1997).
At the local level the authorities have sought to offset the negative effects of the 936 
Section phase out. As a result they passed the Tax Incentives Act o f 1998 providing an 
exemption from Puerto Rican taxes for approved firms26. As well there are tax incentives for 
employment. An important change in the structure o f the tax incentive system is that it “has 
shifted from large tax exemptions to low tax rates”27 (see Table 13 above). In 2001, the 
authorities approved the Export Law (August 2001) in an effort to “promote the distribution of 
products through existing channels such as multinationals retailers and joint venture
9 8agreements” . This law raises the tax credit from 10% to 25% when buying products, which are 
manufactured in Puerto Rico.29
26 The law establishes the levy a 7% flat corporate tax.
27 See, Coinmerce in Puerto Rico. EIU. 2003.
28 Promoexport and the internationalization o f  Puerto R ico’s Producers. Promoexport. Memo. 2003.




The Tax Incentives Act of 1998 
_________________________________ Main provisions__________________________________
.... • The Tax Incentives Act is based on a flat tax of 7% (but that can decrease to 2%) that 
replaces tax exemptions.
• Non-exempt firms are subject to a 39% corporate tax rate.
• Textile, leather, shoes and fish canning operations are subject to a 4% tax.
• Strategic investment may be granted a 0% tax rate.
• Elimination of the ‘tollgate’ tax on repatriated earnings
• High rate of deductions on expenses for job training, human resource development
and research and development.
• Creation of a special fund to invest in new firms and research and development
projects. The fund can use up to 5% of the income tax paid to create new firms.
• Tax incentives are granted to companies that export national products.
• The law also allows companies operating under section 936 or section 30A to qualify 
for tax exemptions.
• Maintains tax incentives for employment (tax deductions include 15% of their payroll 
and 50% of total net income) and property tax benefits (100% exemption is granted 
for one year and 90% for subsequent years).
• Grants a tax credit of 10% of expenditures on local products.
• New tax credit for investors buying plants that will be closing._______________
Source: On the basis o f  official information
This policy o f tax incentives jointly with the structural shift to the services sector and the 
development of Puerto Rico’s natural resource base, i.e., human capital, may define Puerto 
Rico’s growth path in the coming years and define whether it will indeed prove to be a 
‘convergent path’. This will depend in part on whether Puerto Rico can address key issues 
pertaining to this new ‘three legged’ economic foundation.
The changes in tax incentives may give an advantage to CFCs in Puerto Rico since other 
states that have CFCs do not enjoy similar tax incentives. According to non-official sources the 
new policy o f tax incentives has to some extent fulfilled its functions o f providing the incentives 
for firms to maintain their working operations in Puerto Rico. However, the point has been made 
that the legislation for CFCs may prove to create unnecessary complications to what should be a 
simple and transparent investment decision. Moreover the issue o f whether the tax changes can 
revamp a stagnant domestic industrial sector or simply deepen the growing process of 
substitution of local by foreign assets has not been fully contemplated or analysed.
The services sector, important as it is for growth and the process o f convergence, 
(Armstrong and Read, 2003) lacks an adequate statistical database making it difficult to estimate 
its economic contribution. The exception is provided by tourism.
In the case of education, Puerto Rico stands tall relative to other small island States and 
countries o f similar income levels. In Puerto Rico the decomposition o f employed workers by 
years o f education shows that the highest number o f employees is found among those in the
39
labour force with over 12 years of education. Similarly, the number o f degrees, including 
doctorates, masters, and bachelors’ degrees, awarded between 1995 and 2000 rose by 26% while 
in science and engineering they increased by 30% over the same period. Further research also 
shows that, Puerto Rico awarded 1.5 more degrees in engineering per ages 20-24 relative to the 
United States (Stewart, 2003). In spite o f these impressive numbers the quality o f the potential in 




The United Stales 
Gross Product by States 
1977-200J (In Millions of US dollars)
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1 California 229468 263556 295112 328188 368508 393176 426033 484473 529380 567411 624643 685095 743472 798879 814743 831576 847879 879041 925931 973395 104S2S4 1125331 1213355 1330025 1359265
2 New York 178049 197362 215396 234346 259408 280337 303450 339206 366674 393637 425642 462533 479591 502245 504665 535341 55116) 575585 597593 633830 663377 718686 743873 798382 826488
3 Texas 131611 151077 174517 207450 250631 265781 270935 296787 315796 299563 304651 334767 357015 388072 403286 424713 452649 482707 513882 553180 608622 64)405 678808 738270 763874
4 Florida 66374 77462 88830 101411 116000 125617 139784 158762 173505 188073 207264 227234 244631 258344 269845 285518 305036 325556 344771 366318 389473 415564 442613 471623 49(488
S Illinois 115397 128721 140294 146459 159957 163603 172099 192653 205697 217857 231798 250261 263463 275846 285719 303238 317248 342322 359451 375949 400327 423175 440899 466312 .  475541
6 Pennsylvania 100585 112271 123181 130573 141999 145658 155326 170959 180844 190924 206710 224687 238185 249900 260591 275349 288154 301096 318765 329660 347306 365038 380213 399488 408373
7 Ohio 98054 109080 119228 123711 134930 136319 145944 164984 175922 184037 193746 207366 219267 230031 235876 250363 260891 280850 295668 306333 326451 346648 357378 370617 373708
8 New Jersey 66805 74175 82736 90471 100603 107326 119112 134575 146952 159652 176175 197565 208376 216972 224307 235456 246727 258079 271435 285738 299986 316875 332155 357453 365388
9 Michiean 88105 98053 104239 102870 113254 113200 124981 140994 151320 161101 167636 178188 186864 190842 194230 206666 222886 246812 254179 265130 279503 293173 312054 323717 320470
10 Georgia 41181 46767 52248 56947 64326 69097 77366 89467 99285 108860 117883 127655 134953 141415 148722 160814 172220 187645 203505 219520 235733 254891 276510 295539 299874
11 Massachusetts 49671 55636 6(640 68168 75969 8I6S7 90915 103971 (15(31 126051 139558 I52331 15915? 159959 161517 167334 175729 188000 197469 21012? 223571 241369 257802 283072 287802
12 North Carolina 44116 50387 55304 59750 66734 69721 78405 89769 98246 106331 114732 126200 135854 141056 147473 159977 168830 182234 194634 204329 221629 241220 260628 272934 275615
13 Virtdnia 44051 49485 54858 60484 68045 73413 81297 92236 100732 110306 121089 131821 141823 148181 153965 161790 170754 179727 188963 199953 2I210S 228049 241503 260837 273070
14 Washington 35970 42027 48217 51990 57724 60755 65402 71132 74532 80491 86860 95583 104655 115482 122453 130620 138225 146308 151265 161779 175242 192031 208470 218095 222950
15 35522 39445 43450 47280 52846 56027 61861 69761 77030 84150 92519 102728 109587 115008 117630 120734 126442 133952 139495 145061 154646 164100 173836 185049 195007
16 Indiana 47387 53268 57688 58379 63848 63547 67917 77424 81104 85655 91975 99248 106693 110788 114188 123604 131485 141735 148447 155096 162953 176110 181287 189778 189919
17 Minnesota 36276 41084 46379 49701 54624 56435 60567 69904 74422 77875 83979 90085 96246 100432 103923 111908 115420 125017 131841 141540 152334 163009 171490 186097 188050
18 Tennessee 33553 38306 42434 45357 505)8 52349 57331 64696 69287 74150 81462 87835 - 92395 95024 102049 111844 119758 129671 136821 142051 151738 162228 170771 177401 182515
19 41765 47062 51783 53656 58794 61620 66448 75994 79512 84975 90366 97124 102659 104803 110396 115993 119680 129957 139547 146537 155811 163425 168877 177104 181493
20 40894 45741 50599 53372 57701 59460 63029 70133 74241 78087 82389 89964 95431 100448 104918 112347 119508 127187 133694 I4I046 148194 157735 164935 173016 177354
29409 31963 38446 44085 47662 50490 56032 59050 59930 63358 66736 70036 74701 79448 85844 93588 101531 109021 117118 129575 139860 I5233I 169341 173772
29451 33029 36740 40573 45054 48952 53937 61161 66558 72849 81432 89728 95037 98939 100395 103794 107924 112395 118645 124157 134968 142701 149010 161929 166165
23 19230 22843 27183 30263 33429 34322 38256 44502 49295 54646 59055 63401 66005 688S2 71876 79000 85483 9J747 104586 112882 122273 132897 144596 153469 160687
63975 77696 79065 77757 83801 85085 76182 77016 83694 86614 94919 95918 91243 95587 104055 112157 116867 123549 122580 133940 144984 148697
33627 36088 40054 41418 45148 49797 53641 56083 60762 65806 68320 71560 75977 81115 84497 89740 95514 99286 104213 109672 I IÎ095 119319 121490
36679 40629 41636 43272 48969 51668 53538 56830 «1217 6S0S6 67912 70834 76726 80882 86905 91472 95536 101535 107648 112396 117233 120266
30736 32114 31941 33929 37878 39981 42060 45022 49702 53455 57767 60602 64129 69810 75087 81092 91709 97510 102943 110374 121383 120055
28157 3163) 32916 36356 41998 44688 48427 53297 581S5 62275 66076 68776 71934 75955 81515 86880 89854 95447 101384 106800 112197
115204
37661 45547 49495 47968 51935 53426 49019 48866 52789 54676 57780 59698 62013 65035 66979 69960 74855 79423 82189 85389 90942 93855
32818 34016 37667 365S4 36691 4(006 42389 43092 452IJ 48750 52677 55796 57698 61104 62764 69169 71687 76976 81695 83069 85540 89654 90942__
31 Kansas 20324 22620 26188 28047 31642 32998 34750 38070 40520 41337 44041 46296 48347 51467 53576 56338 58380 62206 64069 68160 72998 76648
80208 84526 87196
Table IS 
The United States 
Gross Product by States 
1977-2001 (to Millions of US dollars) 
(ContiiHiatioii)
32 Nevada 7496 9108 10635 12052 13628 14242 15322 16916 18425 20037 22166 25401 28486 31643 33665 36480 39929 45022 49377 54564 59248 63786 69534 75533 79220
33 Utah 10432 12122 13872 15494 17554 18589 19893 22277 24115 24473 25202 27244 28713 31359 33658 35671 38395 42236 46290 51523 55070 59084 62635 68430 70409
34 Arkansas 14918 17337 18962 20088 22609 23187 24953 28254 29131 30443 32349 34597 36833 38362 41277 44610 47188 50921 53809 56796 59141 61298 64993 66793 67913
35 MlSSSfiPDi 15990 17893 20189 21532 24203 24857 26190 29246 30669 31438 33844 36022 37657 39175 41311 44222 47384 51358 54562 56575 58743 61709 64219 66t62 67125
36
District of 
Columbia 15205 16646 18120 19575 21413 22627 24318 26420 28384 30037 32398 35622 38183 40427 42240 44458 46596 47484 48408 48505 50546 52145 55382 59963 64459
37 Nebraska 13532 15523 17138 17897 20373 20616 21163 24088 25415 25816 26803 29011 31161 33518 35482 37593 38665 42032 44084 47772 49275 51349 53494 55649 56967
38 New Mexico t0410 11931 13599 16196 19070 19915 20561 22267 23490 22543 23164 24048 25501 27175 30862 32858 37110 41772 42170 44114 47829 48488 49221 52592 55426
39
New
Hampshire 6353 7491 8488 9428 10594 11446 12696 14903 16833 18707 21530 23294 24105 23883 24948 26396 27507 29410 32388 35068 37470 40529 43360 47385 47183
40 Puerto Rico 8181.7 8996.7 10037 11064.6 12211.7 12693.5 13048.5 14183 15002.2 16014.4 17152.7 18S49.8 19954.2 21619.1 22809 23696.4 25132.9 26644.9 28452J 30357 32342.7 35110.7 38281.2 41418.6 44172.9
41 Hawaii 9390 10520 11978 13435 14524 15506 16909 18550 19991 21536 23421 26019 28811 32268 34002 35549 36308 36766 37243 37490 38537 39371 40662 42524 43710
42 West Vireinia 14659 16260 17783 19068 20475 21215 20830 22770 23517 23854 24546 26354 27254 28304 29331 30901 32240 34774 36315 37220 38281 39024 40525 40926 42368
43 Delaware 5956 6607 7202 7792 8711 9334 10412 11669 13029 14110 15767 17135 19182 20294 22169 23069 23827 25122 27575 29001 31263 32693 34696 37247 40509
44 « - 7565 8379 9273 10192 11196 12077 13139 14857 16087 17468 19367 21680 23071 23498 23635 24397 25358 26501 27987 28925 30409 32208 34102 36276 37449
45 7270 8012 8895 9725 10791 11424 I23I9 13799 15187 16521 17866 19728 21050 21632 21758 22656 23627 24352 25703 26656 29409 30838 31895 36086 36939
46 7050 8337 9186 9808 10527 10494 11567 12477 12977 13074 13813 15038 16707 17739 18655 20354 22758 24893 27155 28101 29388 31041 34584 36755 36905
7456 9051 10816 15007 21473 23133 22254 23560 25871 18637 22025 21354 22934 24774 22021 22372 23014 23104 24791 25774 26S75 24651 25550 28129 28581
5983 6742 6781 7650 7720 8100 9313 9769 10242 10826 11347 12086 13018 14093 15137 16261 17240 18257 19372 19767 20570 21723 23452 24251
9002 10291 10330 10642 11228 11194 11227 11598 11862 12796 13422 14075 15084 16151 16952 17537 18074 18907 19971 20566 21702 22635
5683 6900 8326 10784 13256 13059 12211 12931 13024 11226 11091 11673 12018 13427 13550 13555 14114 14400 14920 15879
16244 16420 17015 19113 20418
4930 5503 5800 6319 6988 7674 8320 9307 10457 11343 11771 11771 12570 13154 13747 13974 14662 15510 16294 17155 18124 19149
52 North Dakota 5260 6464 7257 7626 9942 9966 10030 10794 10750 9819 10193 9744 10645 11473 11634 12740 12855 13895 14529 15855 15910 17053 17093 18SS6 19005
Figure 12













Distribution of Puerto Rico's exports by type of commodity, 2002
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